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NOTES
Access to the Political Arena - Texas Looks to a New
Primary Election Law: Bullock v. Carter and Bullock v. Calvert
Plaintiffs were denied places on their parties' ballot in the 1970 Texas
primary elections when they refused to pay the filing fees required by state
law because they were financially unable to do so.' A petition was filed in
federal court, and later amended to add as additional plaintiffs a number of
voters who wished to vote for the candidate plaintiffs. A three-judge panel
found that the filing fee requirement violated plaintiffs' first and fourteenth
amendment rights and enjoined its enforcement.! The State of Texas appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: The state's interest in
limiting the ballot to a manageable number of candidates and its desire to
collect money to finance the election does not justify discrimination between
candidates on the basis of their ability to pay the fee. Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972).
With enforcement of the original statutes and a legislative attempt at
providing a contingent alternative both enjoined,' Texas Secretary of State
Bullock established an alternative filing fee schedule and new instructions
under which the primary election could be held.4 Relying on his authority as
"chief election officer"' and a federal court order6 as a grant of extraordinary
power to deal with the new circumstances, Bullock presented Comptroller of
Public Accounts Calvert with a number of vouchers for payment of election
expenses. Calvert, relying on an opinion of the Attorney General of Texas,'
'IThe Texas Election Code provided that the county chairman of the party concerned
would prorate the estimated expense of the election among the candidates. No alternate
means was provided for a candidate to have his name placed on the ballot and there was
no provision for write-in candidates. TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. arts. 13.07a, 13.08, 13.08a,
13.09, 13.15, 13.16 (1967). In these particular races the fees were $1,000 (Commissioner
of the General Land Office), $6,300 (County Judge), and $1,424.60 (County Commission-
er). Brief for Appellants at 6, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
'Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
'The legislature passed an act which provided that a candidate could have his name
placed on the ballot if he signed an affidavit to the effect that he was unable to pay the fee
and filed a petition signed by a number of voters equal to 10% of those who voted for his
party's last gubernatorial candidate in the political territory in which the candidate was
running. The act was to become effective Jan. 1, 1972, if the Supreme Court did not con-
sider an appeal from Carter v. Dies or if the Court affirmed that decision. Law of June 15,
1971, ch. 11, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 33. Enforcement of the act was enjoined by the same
three-judge panel which had decided Carter v. Dies. The panel asserted that the alternative
plan did not change the impermissible and unconstitutional nature of the fee. Johnston v.
Luna, 338 F. Supp. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
'Based on the "compelling state interest in regulating the ballot to permit the voter to
make an intelligent choice among candidates for office," the Secretary of State issued an
order which provided filing fees which ranged from zero for party offices to $400 for state-
wide offices, with nominating petitions available as an alternative method of obtaining ballot
position. Order of the Secretary of State of Texas, Feb. 3, 1972. Rules were later promul-
gated which provided additional petition instructions. A form was provided for the petition,
with a requirement that each signature be notarized. Letter from Bob Bullock, Secretary of
State, to All Election Officials, Feb. 7, 1972.
'TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 1.03 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
,The federal court in Johnston v. Luna amended its order on Feb. 2, 1972, to include:
"The Secretary of State is likewise hereby authorized to make such rules and regulations and
to take such other action as may be necessary to effectuate this order and for the uniform
operation of primary elections consistent with Carter v. Dies." TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No.
M-1068, at 5223 (1972).7 TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-1068 (1972).
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refused to honor the vouchers, contending that payment of expenses for party
primaries amounted to use of public funds for a private purpose, an expenditure
prohibited by the Texas Constitution.! Furthermore, the legislature had not
authorized such expenditures. Bullock then initiated mandamus proceedings in
the Supreme Court of Texas to order payment of the vouchers. Held, man-
damus denied: Although payment of expenses for primary elections is payment
for a "public purpose," and is not proscribed by the Texas Constitution, it is
the function of the legislature to authorize and appropriate the necessary funds.'
Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1972).
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Although the right to vote has long been considered a fundamental right,"0
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to delve into matters which it considered
political." This reluctance resulted in a limitation on the extent to which
the Court would afford relief when confronted with cases involving the right
to vote. Thus, the Court would intervene only to protect basic access to the
ballot box, and if the complainant had been allowed to cast a ballot, the state
was held to have discharged its constitutional duty." However, since the 1962
case of Baker v. Carr," the Court has become involved in questions which go
beyond mere access to the ballot. 4 In addition, the Court has applied a more
stringent standard in its examination of various state efforts to deny the vote
to some of the community, requiring a showing of compelling state interest
to justify any classification of voters."
8The Texas Constitution provides that "[tlaxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws and for public purposes only." TEx. CONST. art. VIII, 5 3.
'Two weeks after the decision in Calvert, Governor Smith called a special session of
the Texas Legislature. The legislature passed and the Governor signed the McKool-Stroud
Primary Financing Law of 1972, which gave legislative approval to the election instructions
promulgated by Secretary of State Bullock on Feb. 3, 1972. It further provided that the
state would pay for any expense not covered by the modified filing fees. The sum of 2.15
million dollars was appropriated for this purpose. Law of Apr. 4, 1972, ch. 2, § 1-5,
[1972] Tex. Laws 7. This act, however, provided only for the financing of the 1972 pri-
mary elections, and prior to the 1974 primary the legislature must again consider the matter
of election financing in light of Calvert and Carter.
"See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886): "Though not regarded strictly
as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under
certain conditions, nevertheless [the right to vote) is regarded as a fundamental political
right, because preservative of all rights."
" In 1946, for example, the Court refused to grant relief based on the equal protection
clause in a case involving gerrymandering of legislative districts. Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549 (1946). In Colegrove the Court held that it "ought not to enter this political
thicket . . . . [because the] Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our
governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and,
ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights. Id. at 556.
"'In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959), the
Court reaffirmed the proposition that "[t)he states have long been held to have broad powers
to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised."
"3369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker expressly overruled Colegrove. While Baker did not
mark the demise of the political question doctrine, it did signal a different interpretation ofit.
4 In Baker the Court established the proposition that votes may not be diluted so that
one person's vote is less effective than that of another person. See also Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
"-This difference of approach by the Court in the area of voting is part of the "new"
equal protection which has been discussed by commentators in recent years. See Cox, The
It is important to note, however, that these decisions in the area of voting
rights involved solely the right to exercise the franchise, and in no way in-
volved the right of a candidate to run for office. The Court had held that the
right to be a candidate was not granted by the Constitution."6 In Williams v.
Rhodes, 7 however, the Court revealed that exclusion of the right to candidacy
from the area of protected rights might not be absolute.
The Ohio laws challenged in Williams made no provisions for independent
candidates for presidential electors, and required that new political parties
submit petitions with signatures equalling fifteen percent of the voters in the
last gubernatorial election, while the established parties were guaranteed
ballot position so long as they continued to poll a mere ten percent of the
vote. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, concluded that the facts and cir-
cumstances behind the election laws, which caused the exclusion of certain
candidates, placed a heavy burden on the fundamental right to vote, which in
turn infringed the plaintiff political party's first amendment right of association
and fourteenth amendment right of equal protection of the law. The Court
found that the state's interest in limiting candidate access to the ballot in
order to preserve the two-party system was not sufficiently compelling to
justify such discrimination. The greatest weakness of the Williams decision is
that it left no standard by which lower courts would be able to determine what
methods the states would be allowed in keeping ballots uncluttered.8
A flood of challenges to state election laws followed Williams, the first
of which was Jenness v. Little."8 In Jenness a three-judge district court held
that a filing fee invidiously discriminated on the basis of wealth, and should
be held unconstitutional unless there was an alternative means of obtaining
Supreme Court, 1965 Term; Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 95 (1966); Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1123-32 (1969). While under the previous equal protec-
tion standard it was only necessary for the state to show that there was a reasonable and
rational nexus between the classification which it strove to impose and the goal it wished to
attain, under the "new" equal protection, if a fundamental right is involved or if a suspect
criterion is employed, the Court will apply a strict scrutiny test and require a showing of
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966).
1" Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). But see Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362
(1970), in which the Court reaffirmed Snowden in more circumspect language: "We may
assume that the appellants have no right to be appointed [to the office in question]. But
the appellants . . . do have a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service
without the burden of invidiously discriminatory qualifications." The Court has never relied
solely on the rights of candidates to find that filing fees are a form of invidious discrimina-
tion based on wealth.
1" 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For discussion of Williams, see Barton, The General Election Bal-
lot: More Nominees or More Representative Nominees?, 22 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1970);
Note, The Uncertain Impact of Williams v. Rhodes on Qualifying Minority Parties for the
Ballot, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 236 (1969); Note, The Constitutional Limitations Upon State
Regulation of Its Ballot, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 202 (1969); Note, Ohio Election Laws Making
It Virtually Impossible For Minority Parties To Obtain a Position on the Ballot Declared
Unconstitutional, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 777 (1969). Williams involved complaints by
minority parties in Ohio and was brought to the Court shortly before the 1968 presidential
election. The hurried treatment of the case resulted from the Court's desire that the election
should not be disrupted by a prolonged court case.
"As Chief Justice Warren pointed out in his dissent: "Both the opinion of this Court
and that of the District Court leave unresolved what restrictions, if any, a State can impose
[on the right to candidacy and access to the ballot]." 393 U.S. at 69.
'9306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Matthews v. Little,
397 U.S. 94 (1970).
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ballot position. Shortly thereafter, in Wetherington v. Adams,"0 a different
three-judge court found that the purposes for the Florida filing fee were
rational and reasonable,21 and rejected the strict scrutiny approach taken in
Jenness. Still another district court held that the right to hold office is a
corollary of the fundamental right to vote, and thus required the state to show
a compelling interest to justify discrimination between the candidates." It
was at this rather confused point in the development of the law that the court
in Carter v. Dies enjoined the enforcement of the Texas filing fee law.2"
II. THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS FILING FEES
The Court in Bullock v. Carter directed its attention to the intricate prob-
lem of whether the primary interest in question was that of the candidate or
that of the voter. Conceding that the rights of the voters and the rights of
the candidate are not easily separated, the Court resolved the matter by saying
that "[iun approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine . . .
the extent and nature of their impact on voters."2"
A consideration of the rights of voters rather than candidates begins with
the premise that the voting right is a fundamental right.' Furthermore, the
voter has not only the right to cast a vote, but also the right to cast it effec-
tively.' A vote is not an effective mechanism to promote the voter's interest
unless the voter has a candidate who expresses the voter's wishes. Thus, if the
filing fee excludes the only candidate who expresses the wishes of a voter,
the filing fee impairs that voter's fundamental right to cast an effective vote."
In Carter, however, rather than requiring the state to show a compelling in-
20309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
2 The court interpreted Justice Black's opinion in Williams to mean that the impact of
!he election system as a whole must be considered, rather than any single factor, in determin-
ing whether strict scrutiny should be applied, citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 30. No voters
were joined in Wetherington, hence the fundamental right to vote was not an issue. 309
F. Supp. at 320, 321.
25Thomas v. Mims, 318 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
22321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970). Other cases were decided on the filing fee
issue before Carter, but these cases followed the approach of either Jenness or Wetherington
and will not be discussed here. See, e.g., Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F.
Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), a/I'd sub nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971);
Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla.), injunction granted, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). For other cases decided after the district court's
decision in Carter, see Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex.
1971); Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Gonzales v. City of Sinton,
319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970). These cases generally follow the Jenness rationale,
with the exception of Gonzales, in which the same result was reached without the aid of
the authorities generally cited by the other district courts.
'1405 U.S. at 142, 143. By refusing to consider the fee solely in relation to the rights
of the candidate to be free of any discrimination based on wealth, the Court avoided an
opportunity to extend its earlier reasoning in Turner to invalidate all filing fees. See note 16
supra.
2"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See note 10 supra, and accompanying
text.26 See note 14 supra.
27 In addition, because the fee system regulated the ballot in relation to the ability of
the candidate or his supporters to pay a fee, it fell "with unequal weight on voters, as well
as candidates, according to their economic status." 405 U.S. at 144. Wealth may be a suspect
criterion, and regulation based upon it might be subjected to "strict scrutiny." See Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where the fundamental right to vote was
regulated on the basis of the ability of voters to pay a poll tax. Mr. Chief Justice Burger
purported to adopt the standard used in Harper. 405 U.S. at 144.
NOTES
terest in collecting the fee, the Court required the state to show only a reason-
able necessity.' Even under this seemingly less stringent standard, the state
was unsuccessful in demonstrating a justification for the fee.
The state contended that it had a legitimate interest in recouping the ex-
pense of running the election by use of the filing fee. The Court held that
the filing fee system was not a legitimate means of accomplishing this objec-
tive."9 The state argued further that it had a legitimate interest in limiting
ballot access to serious candidates, but this interest was also held to be in-
sufficient to uphold the fee. Although the Court recognized that "a state has
an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from
frivolous and fraudulent candidacies,"' the Court contended that the fee would
also exclude serious candidates who could not afford to pay it. Chief Justice
Burger stated that "even assuming that every person paying the large fees
required by Texas law takes his own candidacy seriously, that does not make
him a 'serious candidate' in the popular sense.""1
It is the absence of criteria for the determination of who is a serious candi-
date which impedes a solution to the problem. The lack of a substantive
definition of a serious candidate by the Court in Carter leaves open to ques-
tion what methods might be employed to keep frivolous candidates off the
ballot. The Court expressly stated that "nothing herein is intended to cast doubt
on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees or license fees in other con-
texts."' This statement, however, was in response to an argument made by
the state that "[tjhe filing fee as a [sic] initial step in entering a career based
on public service in elective office is no more a form of invidious discrimina-
tion by wealth in the following of a career than the license fees required to
engage in many businesses, professions or union dues.""' The problem is there-
fore narrowed to determining precisely what is a reasonable filing fee. The
only indication of what the Court would consider a reasonable fee is found in a
statement in a footnote by Chief Justice Burger that "[the term 'filing' fee
has long been thought to cover the cost of filing, that is, the cost of placing
a particular document on the public record.""' If this is indeed the limit of
what the Court will consider reasonable, then the states will have to consider
other means by which ballot access can be limited to serious candidates. Such a
small fee would be an ineffective barrier to virtually any frivolous candidate.
It appears that further cases will have to be heard before the Court will
issue a set of guidelines which will clearly establish what standard will be
applied when a state attempts to limit its ballot by means of a filing fee. It is
impossible to determine from Carter whether in future cases a state will be
" Id. at 143. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has relied on this wording in Carter
to uphold filing fees. Because many other means of regulating ballot position had failed,
the New Mexico court found that the state had shown that the fees were reasonably neces-
sary. State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 495 P.2d 1379 (N.M. 1972).29405 U.S. at 147.
3Id. at 145.
31 Id. at 146.2 Id. at 149.
"
5Brief for Appellant at 29, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 143 (1972).
'4405 U.S. at 148 n.29. Indeed, a California court has already accepted this definition
of "reasonable" as the controlling standard by which filing fees must be judged. Zapata v.
Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972).
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required to show a compelling interest or merely reasonable necessity in
order to sustain a filing fee requirement. In addition, the questions of who is
considered a serious candidate and what is a reasonable fee still remain. It has
been asserted that a state might condition ballot position on a showing of
voter support evidenced prior to the election.' The problem is to produce a
"reasonable" procedure which will accomplish such a result.
III. TEXAS RESPONDS TO CARTER
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Bullock v. Calvert, held that although the
payment by the state of primary election expenses did not violate the Texas
Constitution, specific authorization by the legislature was required. This de-
cision was contrary to an earlier decision by the Texas Supreme Court in
Waples v. Marrast, in which it was held that payment of expenses for political
party primary elections was unconstitutional because it was not for a "public
purpose."'4 Since 1916, when Waples was decided, the definition of "public
purpose" has been expanded by Texas courts,"7 and now, after the Calvert
decision, includes primary elections.
After the decision in Calvert, a special session of the legislature was called,
resulting in appropriations totalling 2.15 million dollars to be used to reim-
burse the political parties for the expenses incurred in running the 1972
primaries.' The law enacted by the special session did not permanently change
the Election Code, but merely provided a basis upon which the 1972 primaries
might be held."9 It differed from the old law, which was invalidated by the
Court in Carter, in two major respects. First, filing fees were made standard
throughout the state. Under the old method the amount of the filing fee was a
function of the number of candidates running for a particular office and the
expense involved in running the election for that particular office.' The 1972
's Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent in Williams, pointed out that both the majority
opinion and the district court decision contained
intimations that a State can by reasonable regulation condition ballot position
upon at least three conditions--a substantial showing of voter interest in the
candidate seeking a place on the ballot, a requirement that this interest be
evidenced sometime prior to the election, and a party structure demonstrating
some degree of political organization.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 69-70 (1968).
'4108 Tex. 5, 184 S.W. 180 (1916). Waples dealt with the Texas Presidential Primary
Act of 1913 which provided that parties which polled more than 50,000 votes in the pre-
ceding gubernatorial election would be required to hold a primary for the purpose of se-
lecting presidential electors and that expenses of the election would be paid out of county
funds. Act of Mar. 27, 1913, ch. 46, [19133 Tex. Laws 88. The court held that the Act
violated article VIII of the Texas Constitution. See note 8 supra.
"
7 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959); Coastal
States Gas Prod. Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171, 309 S.W.2d 828 (1958); Housing Authority
v. Higgenbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Davis v. City of Taylor, 123
Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d 1033 (1934); Goodnight v. City of Wellington, 118 Tex. 207, 13
S.W.2d 353 (1929).
38 Act of Apr. 4, 1972, ch. 2, § 4, [1972) Tex. Laws 10. When this amount proved
insufficient to cover the expenses incurred by the parties, available funds were prorated
among the county organizations. The state issued warrants for future payment of the balance.
Letter from Bob Bullock, Secretary of State, to County Chairmen, Aug. 4. 1972. This lack
of sufficient funds is an additional election problem which must be considered by the next
legislature.
"
9Act of Apr. 4, 1972, ch. 2, § 1, [19723 Tex. Laws 7.
"'Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1972).
filing fee schedule set a maximum fee of $400, quite unlike the fee of $6,300
which had been required of one plaintiff-candidate in Carter.4' This fee
schedule was not challenged in the courts, but if the definition of "filing fee"
suggested by Chief Justice Burger is accepted as a guideline of what is reason-
able, then a fee of $400 would be unconstitutional."
The second major change in the Election Code enacted by the special session
was the adoption of Secretary of State Bullock's earlier instruction which
allowed a candidate to obtain ballot position without paying the fee if a
nominating petition was submitted.2 An earlier contingent law had provided
that such a petition could be used as an alternative to paying a filing fee if
the candidate filed a pauper's affidavit," but this statute was struck down by
a district court.' The act passed by the special session did not require such an
affidavit, but did require each signature to be notarized individually.' The dis-
advantage of this plan is that a Texas statute requires a notary public to be
paid a minimum fee of fifty cents."' If this requirement is enforced, a nomi-
nating petition would cost more than the filing fee which the peition avoided."'
During the special session, bills were introduced which would have made
permanent changes to the Election Code, but these died in committee when the
special session was adjourned.'
IV. CONCLUSION
There are presently no provisions in the Election Code which provide for
the financing of the 1974 primary elections. The sixty-third legislature will
have to decide whether to make permanent the system used in the 1972
primary elections or to provide alternative means of keeping non-serious can-
didates off the ballot. The language in Bullock v. Carter is not decisive, conse-
quently there is no assurance that the Supreme Court would not hold that a
filing fee of $400 is unreasonable. Further, the total impact of a scheme which
requires notarization of each signature is arguably just as unconstitutional as
a scheme which allows no nominating petition at all.
If the standard suggested by Chief Justice Warren in his dissent in Williams
v. Rhodes"° is the correct analysis of how states might distinguish between
serious and non-serious candidates, then the legislature would be well advised
to consider major changes in the system which would place minimal emphasis
4, See note I supra.
42See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
41 See note 4 supra.
"Act of Sept. 3, 1971, ch. 11, [1971] Tex. Laws 33.
' Johnston v. Luna, 338 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
"See notes 4, 9 supra.
4 7TEx. REV. CIM. STAT. ANN. art. 3945 (1966).
4' As an example, for a state office, 2,500 signatures are required for a nominating peti-
tion filed in lieu of a filing fee. Order of the Secretary of the State of Texas, Feb. 3, 1972.
If a notary public fee of $.50 were paid for each signature, the petition would cost $1,250.
The fee prescribed for the same office is $400. Id. Apparently the question of whether a
candidate would have to prove payment of the notary fee has not been answered.
49One of these, introduced by Senator McKool, would incorporate most of the features
of the temporary bill. S.B. 2, 62d Legislature, 2d Sess. (1972).
2 393 U.S. 23, 63 (1968); see note 35 supra.
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